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 Introduction 
 The making and delivery of new medicines is not only a process of 
science and technology, of production and marketing, but also a process 
that is inherently political. As such, the relational and political interac-
tions between industry and government are key to shaping regulatory 
environments that either promote or constrain an industry’s ability to 
collectively learn, innovate and grow (Malerba, 2002). Often critical 
to the governing of these relations over time are intermediary actors 
such as industry associations and various advocacy groups that through 
processes of conflict, negotiation and collaboration promote knowl-
edge exchange and institutional capacity building. In developing and 
emerging countries, such intermediaries are likely to play a particularly 
prominent role in filling institutional knowledge gaps towards shaping 
regulation and subsequent industry development (Kshetri and Dholakia, 
2009). Moreover, these interactions between industry and government 
can be particularly complex and often contentious when government 
views an industry as potentially contributing to the public good, as 
in the case of the pharmaceutical industry and its role in the provi-
sion of health care. In such cases, it can be suggested that the strategies 
employed by industry associations over time will need to address the 
needs of the government and the civil society it negotiates with in order 
to effectively advance the interests of the industry it represents. 
 This chapter builds on these notions by analysing the changing role 
of biopharmaceutical industry associations and related umbrella organi-
zations in South Africa since the 1960s when the sector’s first industry 
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association was formed. More specifically, we examine the ways in which 
the changing political context and institutional interplay have shaped a 
South African industry-government relational trajectory that is histori-
cally uneven and reactively contentious. In this case, respective pharma-
ceutical associations have shifted gradually away from pure, narrowly 
aimed lobbying tactics to greater cooperation with government and 
civil society on a host of policy-related issues, from health innovation to 
national goals of development. 
 Our analysis considers developments during three main periods 
through which the South African biopharmaceutical industry has 
evolved: (1) a period of pre-liberalization; (2) a period of expanding 
pluralism; and (3) a period characterized by increasing partnership. 
While the activities of industry associations reside primarily in the 
second and third periods, a discussion of the first period is deemed 
essential in understanding the unfolding of industry-government rela-
tions in subsequent and more recent periods. Findings indicate that 
two decades of both increasing pluralism and globalization have created 
tensions amidst regulatory uncertainties between government and the 
pharmaceutical industry regarding access to medicines on the one hand 
and strong intellectual property rights (IPRs) on the other. We suggest 
that such uncertainties can be reduced through improving interaction 
between biopharmaceutical industry associations, government and 
civil society organizations (CSOs). This can result in more legitimate 
and cumulative platforms for partnering on a number of regulatory 
issues and broader, more holistic developmental aims. 
 We begin this chapter by positioning industry associations as interme-
diaries within a broader policy subsystem and clarifying their importance 
in the developing and emerging country context. We then consider the 
activities of industry associations within wider government-industry 
growth and development coalitions, presenting both the challenges and 
opportunities towards potentially collaborative yet inherently political 
relations. We follow this with a brief overview of the South African case 
and the approach and methodology employed in our analysis. Next, we 
consider the importance of historically embedded relational dynamics 
between government and the pharmaceutical industry in South Africa 
that are punctuated by periods of regulatory uncertainty, mostly 
involving intellectual property regimes that either reinforce or alter 
existing relational trajectories. We underpin our analysis with evidence 
from case studies on four industry associations engaged in the South 
African pharmaceutical industry. 1 These case studies include interviews 
with senior managers, biopharmaceutical and other industry association 
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presidents and government policy makers in relevant departments. 
These findings, along with data collected through various secondary 
sources, lend insights into the current political strategies of biophar-
maceutical industry associations and the possibilities of more develop-
ment-oriented government-industry coalitions going forward. 
 Industry associations and the policy subsystem 
 We define industry associations as industry specific member-based organ-
izations that actively lobby and negotiate with government on their 
members’ behalf to shape government policy and regulation. Included 
in this are business umbrella groups such as chambers of commerce who 
represent the interests of a number of industries and sectors, and are 
engaged in broad industry coalition building. These organizations are 
part of what Sabatier (1991) describes as the ‘policy subsystem’ comprised 
of intermediary bodies regularly involved – through a variety of aggrega-
tion processes – in the shaping of policy within their specific domain 
of interest (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). For developing and 
emerging countries, this subsystem is bound to be particularly impor-
tant where given institutional capacities for innovation and industry 
growth will often be lacking (Frankel, 2006), and where their potential 
development will be the result of politically contested relations between 
government, industry and civil society. Furthermore, these are likely 
to involve considerable negotiation between local and global interests 
(e.g. international bodies and multinational companies [MNCs]). In this 
context, industry associations will likely play a leading role in bridging 
institutional knowledge gaps between government and industry, and 
between the local and the global (Kshetri and Dholakia, 2009). 
 To advocate their members’ interests successfully, industry associations 
will generally need to engage in and perform the following activities and 
functions. First, industry associations will employ far-reaching knowl-
edge and information gathering and dissemination activities that target 
government, the broader industry community and the public. Second, 
industry associations will develop and maintain working relations 
with key individuals and ministries in government, often using ‘elite’ 
members and officials to lead outreach and lobbying efforts (Kshetri 
and Dholakia, 2009). Third, industry associations must be capable of 
building widespread industry coalitions for engaging with government. 
Otherwise, industry fragmentation can result in an ineffective industry 
voice; this can lead to government-industry tensions during times of 
regulatory uncertainty and less-than-optimal policy outcomes. Finally, 
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industry associations will need to function as ‘veto players’ which influ-
ence politics of development and therefore governing structures of 
innovation capabilities (Tsebelis, 2002). In the context of developing 
countries, it is increasingly acknowledged that the political creation of 
successful institutions of innovation happens under significant pressure 
from industry associations (Doner and Sheneider, 2000). 
 Despite their potential contribution to development, negative conno-
tations are often ascribed to industry associations and their activities, as 
they have been viewed as controversial actors of innovation and devel-
opment. For instance, as early as the 18th century, Adam Smith, in his 
 The Wealth of Nations , accused industry associations of playing a nega-
tive role in the economy, conspiring against the public or raising the 
prices of goods. More recently, industry associations have been viewed 
as special interest groups and/or elitist organizations that pursue narrow 
rents for a limited number of members at the expense of the wider 
sector and economy, discouraging competition and thus curtailing 
collective innovation within an industry (see Olson, 1982; Schmitter 
and Streeck, 1999). This aligns with ideas concerning corporatism where 
national economic policy is formed through closely coordinated collab-
oration between government, industry and labour, either imposed by 
the government (state corporatism) or formed voluntarily (neo-corpo-
ratism) (see Schmitter, 1974; Cawson, 1986). Examples of these might 
be apartheid-era South Africa and contemporary Sweden, respectively 
(Thomas, 2004). Schmitter (1974) was concerned with what he coined 
‘societal corporatism’, where a small number of interest organizations 
are able to monopolize the policy subsystem, competitively eliminating 
other interest groups and essentially forcing the government to enter 
into collaborative relations with industry due to political necessity 
(Maree, 1993). In some cases, some form of societal corporatism may 
be beneficial, allowing for more rapid development of national capaci-
ties during times of necessity or crisis. The obvious downside of societal 
corporatism is that the state can become beholden to a few key interest 
groups, for example a small group of domestic conglomerates or a select 
number of foreign companies. In this way it is thought that industry 
associations, in certain political contexts, can even threaten democracy 
(Cawson, 1982). 
 State-industry relations and coalitions towards development 
 While industry associations may influence the shaping of government-
industry relations, the strategies they employ and the subsequent extent 
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to which government and industry work together may be determined 
more by long-standing and embedded relational dynamics between 
the two. Relations between government and industry are often referred 
to as coalitions, in that some degree of co-dependence and thus coop-
eration between government and industry is not only inevitable but 
necessary. In the context of developing countries, relations between 
government and industry may be characterized as ‘growth coalitions’, 
ranging from ‘weak growth coalitions’ where there is at least a minimal 
recognition that ‘business needs the support of government to make 
profits; governments need to share in these profits to finance govern-
ment and politics’ (Moore and Schmitz, 2008: 1), to ‘strong growth 
coalitions’ where government and industry engage in active coopera-
tion towards the goal of policies that both parties expect to foster invest-
ment and increase in productivity (Brautigam et al., 2002). According to 
Schneider and Maxfield (1997), strong growth coalitions require govern-
ment and industry to share information and to have a high degree of 
‘reciprocity, trust, and credibility’ towards one another. However, this 
does not change the fact that growth coalitions presuppose bargaining 
or compromises between industrial and political elites and CSOs. Khan 
(1995, 2000) refers to such coalitions as forms of political settlements – 
the balance-of-power among contending elites, CSOs and social groups. 
Political settlements are based on a common understanding of how 
narrow elitist interests can be served through policies of innovation and 
development. 
 Since the 1980s, a main focus of political-industrial settlements or 
government-industry relations for many developing countries, including 
South Africa, has been the implementation of neo-liberal economic poli-
cies. Cornerstones of this policy approach include currency stabilization, 
denationalization of industry, trade liberalization through the lowering 
of trade barriers, providing incentives for exporters and reducing favour-
able treatment of domestic firms, as well as the cutting of deficits for 
decreasing inflation and lowering interest rates – all aimed at spurring 
domestic innovation and growth in conjunction with increased foreign 
direct investment. Results of such neo-liberal-focussed growth coali-
tions have been mixed, with many developing countries experiencing 
sharp yet isolated increases in growth and wealth production amidst 
continued widespread poverty. For developing countries, therefore, it 
has been argued that government-industry growth coalitions need to 
evolve to a more development-oriented model that focuses on poverty 
alleviation over an extended period of time (Brautigam, 1997, 2009; 
Handley, 2008). Seekings and Nattrass (2011: 339) argue, however, that 
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development coalitions necessitate ‘much deeper deliberation and nego-
tiation than a growth coalition: the objective is not only to agree on the 
mix of public sticks and carrots that serve to promote economic growth, 
but to agree on a mix that promotes a particular pattern of growth’, one 
that is focussed on the needs and welfare of the poor. For industry and 
the associations that negotiate with government on industry’s behalf, 
such a move would require a considerable shift away from pure lobbying 
to greater partnering with government. 
 The global pharmaceutical industry and 
the case of South Africa 
 The global biopharmaceutical industry is comprised of a relatively small 
number of large research-oriented MNCs based mainly in the developed 
North and a large number of both small and large companies that manu-
facture generic medicines both in the developed North but most promi-
nently and increasingly so in the developing South (see Chapter 6). 
Most generics manufacturers operate as independent companies while 
others are subsidiaries of large MNCs. The research-based MNCs make 
generally large profits through the global sale of patented blockbuster 
drugs which are more expensive than generics and are at times priced 
out of the reach of poor patients. The research-based MNCs insist that 
the high prices for the medicines they sell and the profits they garner 
are necessary for covering the costs of marketing and continued R&D 
activities. But the inability of many to pay these prices, including the 
governments of developing countries, and the increasing expiration of 
many patented medicines have facilitated the tremendous growth of the 
generics industry which has substantially lowered the price for a number 
of essential medicines, including anti-malarial, and anti-retroviral drugs, 
among many others, some experiencing a 50–90% reduction in price, 
thus considerably increasing access to these medicines. The growth of 
the generic medicines industry and its impact on research-based MNCs 
have created considerable fragmentation and conflict within the phar-
maceutical industry and between the pharmaceutical industry and the 
governments of emerging countries such as South Africa. 
 South Africa’s economic growth for the last few years has averaged 
2–3% and it slowed down to 2.0% in 2014. However, as the second-
largest African economy after Nigeria the country exerts strong economic 
and political influence on the African continent. The country made the 
transition from an apartheid state to a constitutional democratic state in 
1994. Since then, South Africa has experienced considerable economic 
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growth, but also increased inequality and extreme poverty in certain 
sections of the population. In the area of biopharmaceuticals, the 
country has emerged as the industry forerunner in Africa with a signifi-
cant presence of both domestic manufacturers and MNCs, although the 
domestic manufacturing industry is relatively small, with up to 65% 
of the country’s pharmaceuticals still being imported (IPASA, 2013). 
Furthermore, its private market, worth US$2.8 billion in 2012, is rela-
tively small and constitutes less than 1% of the market globally. In 2011, 
two leading pharmaceutical companies in South Africa were domesti-
cally based MNCs, Aspen Pharmacare and Adcock Ingram; domestic 
companies import up to 90% of active pharmaceutical ingredients from 
other countries, including India and China. Meanwhile, historically, 
and presently, the country has had a number of active biopharmaceu-
tical industry associations, making it an important case study for inves-
tigating the realities of pharmaceutical production in Africa and the role 
of industry associations in it. 
 With respect to industry associations, companies in this sector are 
members of different associations depending on the segment of the 
market that they occupy. Most foreign MNCs are members of the newly 
formed Innovative Pharmaceutical Association South Africa (IPASA), 
which emerged from a merger between two former associations, 
Innovative Medicines South Africa (IMSA), for research-based/inno-
vator MNCs; and Pharmaceutical Industry Association of South Africa 
(PIASA), whose membership included both innovator and generics 
companies. The new association, IPASA currently represents 24 inno-
vative pharma companies dedicated to producing or importing inno-
vative medicines in South Africa. According to IPASA, only companies 
that conduct their own R&D qualify for membership. This means that 
domestic companies with no intellectual property (IP) are excluded from 
the new association. Only IP holders, for example MNCs with inno-
vator products, can become members of IPASA. In addition to IPASA, 
there is also the National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
(NAPM), Pharmaceuticals Made in South Africa (PHARMISA), Self-
Medication Manufacturers Association of South Africa (SMASA) and 
National Association of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers (NAPW), among 
others. They also all belong to the Pharmaceutical Task Group (PTG), 
a broad coalition involving IPASA, NAPM, PHARMISA and SMASA. The 
PTG deals with the government on issues of mutual concern such as 
pricing, regulation and national health insurance. For example, the PTG 
has retained an advocate to represent the pharmaceutical industry in 
the Competition Commission enquiry into high health care prices. That 
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being said, many of these associations and member companies are also 
members of the leading chambers of commerce, CHAMSA and SACCI, 
and connect with one another through these platforms. This current 
status of industry has evolved through two main periods: pre-liberaliza-
tion and the post-apartheid. 
 Pre-liberalization era 
 While disagreements over the past two decades on particular regula-
tory issues have at times stymied relations between the South African 
pharmaceutical industry and the South African government, tensions 
between the two are very much rooted in a long history of tense and 
generally non-negotiable relations between the South African govern-
ment and the South African business elites, which have carried over into 
more recent periods from the apartheid era. As Seekings and Nattrass 
(2011: 343–44) explain, 
 Indeed, relations between state and business in South Africa 
throughout the 20th century were framed by the coexistence of a 
strong state and powerful corporate capital. The state enjoyed consid-
erable political autonomy from capital, but remained dependent on 
capital for continued economic growth. The outcome was often tense 
relationships, as the state sought to push and bully capital into subor-
dinate co-operation, whilst avoiding genuine deliberation, and being 
careful not to undermine white prosperity. 
 As such, during the apartheid era, the South African government was 
intent on maintaining and enriching the white minority through ever 
increasing control and exploitation of the black majority. This neces-
sitated a command-oriented state, the brutal subjugation of blacks and 
the complicity of white-owned industry which was dominated by a 
small number of large state-supported conglomerates all linked in some 
manner to the South African gold-mining industry. Offering consid-
erable trade protection (much of this induced through international 
boycott) and ensuring low-wage black labour, the South African govern-
ment expected industry to operate within certain constraints and to be 
‘subservient, as long as it was dependent on state patronage’ (Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2011: 344); this resulted in a state-industry relationship 
that was generally reactive yet ultimately accommodating in terms of 
industry response, and largely devoid of negotiated compromise. 
 With an economy centred on mining and energy extraction, and stag-
nated by the apartheid system and resulting sanctions and boycotts, the 
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South African government lacked the ability and capacity to either invest 
in a broad-based science and technology infrastructure (e.g. weak univer-
sity R&D) or facilitate the growth of technology-based industries (the 
exception being defence). A strong domestic pharmaceutical industry 
was never really established in South Africa during this period. The need 
for medicines, however, meant that large research-based pharmaceutical 
MNCs continued to sell and distribute medicines in South Africa, with 
some operating manufacturing facilities in the country. That being said, 
two pharmaceutical companies, Sterling Winthrop and Merck, divested 
their interests in South Africa and left the country due to the boycott. 
A few domestic generics-based pharmaceutical companies such as 
Adcock Ingram were able to successfully operate under the constraints 
of apartheid, but their growth and proliferation would not really occur 
until after apartheid’s end. During this period, two main biopharma-
ceutical industry associations were established. The first was the South 
African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), established in 
1967, and the second was the National Association of Pharmaceutical 
Manufactures (NAPM), established in 1977. The membership of the 
PMA was a mix of domestic and foreign-owned pharmaceutical compa-
nies, but the MNCs were more dominant given their market strength; 
members of NAPM, by contrast, were almost solely domestic manufac-
turers of generics. Both associations used to work closely with govern-
ment and/or play advisory roles in policy areas such as health and drug 
manufacturing. This was consistent with the corporatist state-industry 
relations of the apartheid era. 
 Post-apartheid South Africa 
 South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994 led to weakening of 
the corporatist hold of the state and strengthening of the civil society 
(Lehman, 2008). This does not imply that a pluralist approach to state-
industry relationships prevailed. Rather, pluralism and corporatism seem 
to coexist in post-apartheid South Africa. The relationships between 
industry associations and state appear to be co-operative; govern-
ments tend to view the business elites as a key player in pro-market 
liberal reforms. Indeed, as Seeking and Nattrass (2011: 339) point out, 
‘Capitalism not only survived the transition from apartheid to democ-
racy, but high profit rates suggest that capitalism continues to flourish 
in the post-apartheid environment’. This is precisely the reason why 
South Africa, despite its exceptional economic performance, experi-
ences increased inequality and extreme poverty in certain sections of 
population, namely the black majority. The co-operative state-industry 
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relations in the post-apartheid era failed to form a strong ‘growth 
coalition’ that could also deliver development. Therefore, within the 
governing party – the African National Congress (ANC) – the new 
political elite(s) developed distrust against the business elite(s). The 
ANC adopted pro-market policies with respect to the global economy 
without necessarily having a pro-business or pro-industry attitude. 
According to Seeking and Nattrass (2011: 344), ‘In the early 1990s, 
two views of businesses coexisted within the ANC. On the one hand, 
business was seen to have been one of the pillars of apartheid, exploita-
tive of workers and abusive of consumers. On the other, there was a 
growing appreciation of the overall weakness of South African capi-
talism, in particular its inefficiencies stemming from chronic protec-
tion against foreign competition and over-concentration’. The first 
view clearly supported regulation of employment relations and protec-
tion of black businesses. The second view supported trade liberaliza-
tion and industrial policy. As Seeking and Nattrass (2011) observe, 
both views entailed a commandist approach to business and industry 
without so much negotiation. 
 In this post-apartheid mix of corporatism and pluralism, large phar-
maceutical companies began to re-establish themselves in South Africa, 
insisting on strong protection of patented drugs through TRIPS. On the 
other hand, CSOs such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
advocacy groups began to formally participate in the policy-making 
process (Lehman, 2008). In 1994 there were more than 50,000 NGOs in 
South Africa, most of them pursuing development objectives (Fioramonti, 
2005). In the post-apartheid era, the state inherited a strong regulatory 
capacity (ibid) and relied on it to protect public health from the spread 
of diseases such as HIV/AIDS through the poorest sections of popula-
tion. According to Seekings and Nattrass (2011: 353), ‘Its interventions 
in the private sector were programmatic rather than targeted in that the 
state legislated frameworks for change ... and then endeavoured – with 
mixed success – to ensure that private sector complied with the statutory 
requirement’. 
 One well-known intervention was the government’s 1997 Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Act that would allow South Africa to 
import and manufacture cheaper generic HIV drugs. This Act prompted 
39 big pharmaceutical companies (mainly MNCs) to file through PMA 
a patent right lawsuit against the South African government – the 
so-called Big Pharma v Nelson Mandela case. In response, CSOs and 
activists accused PMA of violations of the human right to health by 
making essential medicines unaffordable and called the international 
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community to protect developing countries against big pharmaceutical 
companies (Wolff, 2012). Although in 2001 PMA agreed to drop the 
lawsuit as a result of the growing opposition, it was too late. The PMA 
suffered an international public relations disaster with three MNCs, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Merck and Bristol-Meyers Squibb, breaking ranks with 
36 other companies and pushing hard for a settlement that would stave 
off increasing damage ( The Guardian , 2001). Eventually, these 36 compa-
nies agreed to go along with the lawsuit withdrawal, but PMA dissolved, 
splitting into two new associations: the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Association of South Africa (PIASA) and the Innovative Medicines South 
Africa (IMSA). 
 PIASA was established as an association of companies involved in the 
manufacturing and marketing of medicines in South Africa. Its members 
were research-based MNCs and local manufacturers of pharmaceuticals. 
PIASA had about 90 members, consisting of both large and small compa-
nies. Other organizations, such as the South Africa Medical Device 
Industry Association (SAMED), were members of PIASA, testifying to the 
diversity of the association. The objective of PIASA was to shape stra-
tegic regulatory issues relating to clinical trials, registration of medicines 
and IPRs. In addition to this, the association tried to tackle regulatory 
hurdles that discourage investment in South Africa’s biopharmaceu-
tical sector. PIASA was also engaged in activities to influence the quality 
and cost of medicines, access to treatment, health insurance, drug laws 
and pharmaco-economic evaluation. Among such activities advocacy, 
networking and innovation diffusion appear to be the most crucial ones. 
PIASA interacted with government but also with other associations, 
including IMSA in the health policy and regulation arenas. For instance, 
it had substantial involvement in the formulation of the South African 
Health Charter and Private Health Care Reform programmes. This close 
interaction of PIASA with government was often seen as uneven, given 
the conflict of public and private interests. Another important activity 
of PIASA was diffusion of knowledge through hiring consultants and 
providing members with expert advice on pertinent issues in the health 
innovation and regulation terrains. Such issues included standards for 
manufacturing facilities, drug registration fees and regulatory harmo-
nization. This range of activities in the institutional context of South 
Africa indicates that PIASA played a crucial role in influencing the coun-
try’s innovation system. 
 By contrast, IMSA was established as an industry association for 
research-based companies, even though some of its members also used 
to produce generics. This is not surprising; generics are crucial for the 
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public health service in the country. Among IMSA’s members there were 
12 MNCs who captured about 53% of the MNC market share in South 
Africa. Generally speaking, this biopharmaceutical association engaged 
in R&D policy, innovation regulation and lobbying. IMSA did not always 
perform such activities alone but in collaboration with other associa-
tions. Thus, for instance, in the PTG initiative IMSA played an active 
role in national health insurance issues, working jointly with PIASA 
and other public actors of South Africa. Another key focus of IMSA 
was on IPRs, especially access to drugs and marketing. The association 
worked with and through its members to exert influence on these issues. 
IMSA’s key contacts in government were the Department of Health, the 
Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Trade 
and Industry. It also made policy contributions to parliament’s port-
folio committee on health. However, IMSA also functioned as a govern-
ment tool for industrial policy implementation. That is to say, it worked 
closely with government for the implementation of broader national 
policies by their members, for example requirements under the Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme. 
 The split of PMA into PIASA and IMSA was not the most negative 
consequence of the ‘Big Pharma v Nelson Mandela’ case. After all, 
in April 2013 these associations came together again, forming the 
Innovative Pharmaceutical Association South Africa (IPASA). It might be 
argued that the most negative consequence of the ‘Big Pharma v Nelson 
Mandela’ case was the damage to trust between government and biop-
harmaceutical associations. As one interview respondent pointed out, 
 [P]re-1994 I think the industry was more in an advisory role, although 
perhaps not with lobbying focus, access to government ministries 
was quite possible. What changed it completely for the industry was 
the court case of 1998 to 2004 which was all about weakening intel-
lectual property and so created a sense that we [the industry] were 
against the government. So from that time onward, whenever you 
went into the halls of government, they [the government] would see 
you as ‘you are that industry that took us to court’; so that created 
such animosity between the Department of Health, the relationship 
has never really been constructive. (Interview extract: 23) 
 This statement confirms that, in South Africa, state-business relations 
(SBR) in the area of biopharmaceuticals remain fragile and therefore 
lack essential characteristics of effectiveness. According to Cali and Sen 
(2011: 1543), such characteristics include:
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 (i) transparency: whether there is a flow of accurate and reliable infor-
mation, both ways, between business and government, and from 
representatives of business to their own members; (ii) reciprocity: 
whether there is capacity and autonomy of state actions to secure 
improved performance in return for subsidies; (iii) credibility: whether 
the state command credibility of the private sector, and whether capi-
talists are able to believe what state actors say; and (iv) whether there 
is mutual trust between the state and the business sector. 
 Clearly, South African SBR in the area of biopharmaceuticals are neither 
transparent and reciprocal nor credible and mutually trusting. Rather, 
due to the long-term impact of the ‘Big Pharma v Nelson Mandela’ case, 
these relations are based on mutual suspicion and distrust. 
 Analysis and discussion: resetting the state-industry 
relationships 
 Since its formation in 2013, IPASA has been engaged in a highly 
uneven relationship with government over the latter’s policy plan to 
change the patent rules for medicines. That plan incorporates patent 
flexibilities after the Doha Declaration (WTO, 2001) and recommends 
elimination of weak patents, promoting the production of generics 
(DTI, 2013). In response, IPASA embarked on a campaign against the 
full implementation of the government plan, lobbying the govern-
ment and other national and international actors for a stronger IPR 
regime. Its main objection is that by using TRIPS flexibilities and by 
promoting generics, the South African government’s plan on IP policy 
will reduce innovation and fail to attract investment, particularly 
FDI, into knowledge-based firms such as those in biopharmaceuticals 
(IPASA, 2013). The South African government insists that the issue is 
not about weakening the TRIPS regime and the country’s biopharma-
ceutical innovation system, but about implementing TRIPS with all 
the necessary flexibilities for the sake of public good ( The Economist , 
2014). The tension between government and IPASA (the majority 
of research-based pharma MNCs) heightened substantially when it 
was made known that IPASA was participating (perhaps leading) a 
campaign in collaboration with a Washington, DC-based public rela-
tions firm that aimed to promote the supposed adverse consequences 
of a weak IPR regime as proposed by the government, to target the 
South African public, business community and academic institutions. 
This bypassing of the government by IPASA in its attempts to thwart 
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government policy, and doing so during an election year, fuelled 
already high levels of distrust between the South African government 
and the research-based, primarily foreign-owned pharmaceutical 
companies. 
 The above episode is an apparent setback to relations that, while 
recently punctuated with conflict, have been defined more by 
increasing collaboration both within industry on key regulatory issues, 
particularly taxation and medicine registration procedures, and with 
government on broader health care policy. For example, a number 
of these biopharmaceutical industry associations have been involved 
more recently in wider policy discussions with government regarding 
science and technology workforce development, industry-university 
collaboration and the role of research-based pharmaceutical companies 
in the development and implementation of a South African National 
Health Insurance scheme. Resetting relations will require reengaging 
government on such issues, but huge differences on IPR will need to be 
addressed, if not wholly overcome. Even though stronger IPR laws are 
supported by much of South Africa’s business community (e.g. SACCI 
supports a stronger IPR regime), the research-based pharmaceutical 
industry, due to its status as an important yet ‘reluctant’ and untrust-
worthy medicines provider, will need to go further. It needs to shed the 
perception that its interests in South Africa do not go beyond clinical 
trials and the profit-driven motive of protecting of its patented medi-
cines and future therapies for sale not only in South Africa but the 
entire African continent. 
 For its part, the South African government needs to decide what type 
of role it sees the pharmaceutical industry playing in a relatively poor 
yet modern South Africa. On one hand, the South African government’s 
approach to access to affordable medicines has indeed increased access, 
but has also resulted in a growing reliance on foreign generics (e.g. from 
India) rather than the development of a domestic generics industry. On 
the other hand, it has recently put forward public-private partnership 
(PPP) initiatives towards developing indigenous high-tech industries 
such as biotech, yet has not sufficiently articulated, at least in public, 
the role of IPR or the pharmaceutical industry in this new policy vision. 
This seeming contradiction is played out between government minis-
tries, particularly long-standing divisions between the Department of 
Health, which supports weak IPR laws for ensuring access to affordable 
medicines, and Science and Technology (DST), which favours stronger 
IPR laws as a means of fostering innovation more generally and realizing 
the positive externalities that a robust research-based pharmaceutical 
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industry might provide South Africa. However, DoH and the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) are aligned in the area of access to health. 
Such intra-government divisions, while justified, do complicate negotia-
tions with industry and likely reinforce industry fragmentation between 
research-based MNCs and generics manufacturers. Current fragmenta-
tion on both sides of the negotiating table are contributing to tense 
relations between the South African government and the pharmaceu-
tical industry and probably resulting in policy inertia and far less-than-
optimal regulation. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have considered the neglected role of industry 
associations in Africa as key intermediaries in innovation that, 
through evolutionary processes of conflict, negotiation and knowl-
edge diffusion, facilitate institutional capacity building while shaping 
regulation and subsequent industry development. To do so, we have 
analysed the shifting strategies over time of biopharmaceutical 
industry associations and related organizations in South Africa. We 
have considered the importance of historically embedded relational 
dynamics between government and the pharmaceutical industry in 
South Africa involving critical junctures of regulatory uncertainty, 
mostly involving highly contested intellectual property regimes. 
Tracing developments during three main periods within different 
national context, our findings support previous research that suggests 
industry associations are more effective in lobbying and negotiating 
with government when industry is relatively cohesive and able to 
speak with one voice. This chapter, however, also suggests that in 
the case of the pharmaceutical industry, the extent to which industry 
associations can effectively engage with government is determined, 
in large part, by the willingness of government over time to neither 
demand nor capitulate, but to compromise with industry in ways 
that meet its own requirement for accessible medicines while recog-
nizing the positive externalities of a robust domestic pharmaceutical 
industry. When such willingness is limited, either long-standing or 
temporarily, biopharmaceutical industry associations in South Africa 
are increasingly asserting themselves as ‘partners’ with government 
in attempts to correct these long-held tensions with the aim towards 
negotiating better policy outcomes. 
 In the case of South Africa, decades of tension between government 
and industry in general, which carried over from the apartheid era, have 
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exacerbated long-standing pharmaceutical industry fragmentation on 
key policy issues such as IPR, particularly those between MNCs and 
domestic generics companies. In turn, this has inhibited constructive 
policy dialogue and reinforced industry-government distrust, particularly 
regarding the pervasive assumption that the growth of an innovation-led 
biopharmaceutical industry in South Africa is incompatible with wide-
spread access to effective and affordable medicines. Subsequent policy 
divisions between the DOH and DST both mirror the overall divisions 
and mistrust between industry and government and may contribute to 
regulatory inefficiencies. This has placed South Africa’s biopharmaceu-
tical industry associations, particularly those representing MNCs, often 
in direct and open conflict with government. 
 Finally, the historical trajectory and the shift to greater partnering 
strategies captured here provide insight into the conditions and proc-
esses through which ‘growth coalitions’ in developing countries such as 
South Africa either remain weak and ineffective in terms of developing a 
domestic industry or grow strong in that they effectively promote both 
the growth of domestic industry and the subsequent realization of posi-
tive externalities and spill-overs. In doing so, the challenges of moving 
government-industry relations to a more effective ‘development coali-
tion’ model that is focussed on growth and poverty alleviation are laid 
bare. In the case of South Africa, the government and the pharma-
ceutical industry seem to be locked, based on decades of tension and 
mistrust, in a rather weak ‘growth coalition’ that, while promoting the 
interest of a few key industry players and keeping prices of medicines 
low, has kept the domestic South African pharmaceutical industry rela-
tively small, dependent on foreign generic suppliers, with few positive 
externalities or spill-overs gained. For moving towards a stronger growth 
coalition, the biopharmaceutical industry associations of South African 
will need to build trust with government and to reconcile industry divi-
sions among themselves. 
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 1 .  In total, 19 interviews were conducted, involving 4 industry associations: 
Innovative Pharmaceutical Industry Association (IPASA), National Association 
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (NAPM), South African Chambers of 
Commerce (SACCI) and South African Medical Device Industry Association 
(SAMED). 
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